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THE DESCENDANTS OF F ASSIHI: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF RECENT CASES ADDRESSING THE FIDUCIARY
CLAIMS OF DISGRUNTLED STAKEHOLDERS AGAINST
ATTORNEYS REPRESENTING CLOSELy-HELD ENTITIES

MATIHEW 1. ROSSMAN·

INTRODUCTION

It has been over twenty years since the Michigan Court of Appeals
considered and decided Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz & Tyler,
P.c. 1 This case involved a suit by one fifty percent shareholder (Fassihi) of a
closely held corporation against the corporation's attorney after Fassihi was
forced out of the business by the other fifty percent shareholder, allegedly with
the attorney's help. Fassihi has since come to stand for the general proposition
that an attorney who represents a closely-held business entity may owe a
fiduciary duty, akin to that owed to a client, to each of the emity's individual
stakeholders2 even when she does not represent them individually.3 This duty is
especially likely to exist when the entity has a small number of stakeholders and
is particularly likely to be implicated when the entity, or those who control it,
asks for the assistance or advice of the attorney in taking action adverse to a
stakeholder. Although by no means the only case of its time to address an
attorney's duties to constituents of a "closely-held" client,4 Fassihi is the

* Associate Professor of Law, Case Westem Reserve University School of Law. B.A.,
1992, Miami University; J.D., 1996, New York University School of Law. My thanks to Doug
Frenkel , Mark Lekan, and Eileen Sullivan for reviewing and commenting upon the initial draft of
this Article and to Ursula Rossman for her assistance and support through every stage of its
production.
l. 309 N.W.2d 645 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
2. "Stakeholder," for purposes of this Article, essentially means "constituent," as that term
is derined in the Comment to Rule 1.13 of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct ("MRPC"), but of a "closely held entity," rather than a large publicly traded
corporation. "Constituent" is defined in the Comment to mean "[o]fficers, directors, employees and
shareholders ... ofthe corporate organizational client'· and "the positions equivalent to [those] held
by persons acting for organizational clients that are not corporations" and applies to all
organi zations, no matter the size or complexity. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt.
1 (2003). Because the cases discussed in this Article specifically address closely held entities, it
is important to distinguish the use of the term "constituents" in this context. The term
"stakeholder," with its connotation of equity ownership, is appropriate considering that in most
closely held entities most or all of the constituents are equity owners.
3. See, c.g., RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNINGLAWYERS § 56 cmt. h (2000).
4. The terms "close," "closed," and "closely-held" are often used interchangeably as
adjectives before "corporation" to mean corporations with a relatively limited number of
shareholders, the shares of which are not publicly traded. 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B.
THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.02 (rev. 3ded. 2002 (1971).
Certain states further refine this general concept by providing that close corporations are those in
which there is "substantial majority stockholder participation in the management, direction and
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preeminent case recognizing a stakeholder's claim of breach of fiduciary duty
against an attorney who represents only the business.
Twenty years after Fassihi, its central proposition has certainly not gained
universal acceptance in the nation's courts. Some jurisdictions have flat out
rejected it, while others have confused or combined the question of whether a
fiduciary relationship exists between an attorney and individual stakeholder with
the question of whether they have established a separate attorney-client
relationship. 5 Furthermore, disgruntled stakeholders routinely assert other
theories of fiduciary-type liability, which have also received uneven treatment in
the courts, against business attorneys in circumstances factually similar to
Fassihi.
The resulting lack of certainty is disconcerting for attorneys Who represent
closely-held entities. What is disconcerting is not that courts are developing or
expanding theories of liability to hold accountable attorneys who clearly behave
improperly, but rather that it is difficult to gauge where courts stand on these
theories. Perhaps even more perplexing, the theories are not always consistent
in their application with guidelines governing attorney behavior-in particular,
the guidelines established by the American Bar Association's ("ABA") Model
Rules of Professional Conduct ("MRPC,,).6
This state of affairs could adversely impact both lawyers for closely-held .
businesses and the clients they serve. Uncertainty regarding to whom within a
business a lawyer owes duties could cause risk averse lawyers to avoid serving
closely-held businesses, impose "self-protective reservations,,7 in the attorney
client relationship, or overcompensate by considering the interests of an entity
and each of its individual constituents whenever a significant decision needs to
be made, even when this would not otherwise be appropriate. Less cautious
attorneys could be subject to overbroad liability and the risk of lawsuits

operations of the corporation" and/or where restrictions are placed on the transfer of its shares. Id.
(citing Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass.
1975»; see also BROOKE WUNNICKE, ETHICS COMPLIANCE FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS 231 (1987)
(citing Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 511).
Considering that almost all jurisdictions and the MRPC use the same or similar analysis for
most business entities, e.g., corporation, partnership, LLC, etc., when determining an attorney's
representational obligations, the author of this Article will use the more universal terms "closely
held business" or "closely-held entity" rather than "closely-held corporation." See MODEL RUlES
OFPROF' LCONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003); see also id. at R. l.J3 cmt. 1; ABA Comrn. on Ethics and
Prof! Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-361, at 2 (1991) ("There is no logical reason to distinguish
partnerships from corporations or other legal entities in determining the client a lawyer represents.")
5. See infra Part LB.
6. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF' LCONDUCT (2003).
7. This phrase appears in Goodman v. Kennedy, 556 P.2d 737,743 (Cal. 1976), to describe
one consequence associated with overbroad liability in this context. The contention is that the
lawyer will modify and/or withhold advice to an entity client to avoid any negative impact on the
interests of individual stakeholders and thus minimize the threat of claims by disgruntled
stakeholders.
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whenever a stakeholder feels he or she has gotten the short end of the stick in a
dispute relating to the business. In fact, the author's interest in this subject grew
out of his own experiences representing small businesses and repeatedly
encountering the ethical and professional dilemmas caused when formerly rosy
relationships among business partners began to wither.
In recent years, several courts have addressed claims resulting from what
ought be referred to as the "Fassihi Scenario," i.e., when a stakeholder in a
closely-held business contends that the actions of one or more other stakeholders
or the entity have adversely affected him or her and that the attorney is partially
to blame for her participation in, or even mere facilitation of, whatever took
place. These cases are worth examining closely for several reasons. First, they
underscore how jurisdictions continue to differ on whether and to what degree
attorneys must heed the interests of individual stakeholders while counseling a
business on ·a decision or course of action that directly affects stakeholders'
interests. At the same time, the cases do indicate some uniform trends in the
courts on the viability of particular fiduciary-based theories of attorney liability
frequently asserted by disgruntled stakeholders and provide a good sense of
where the law is headed. Finally, considering these cases in combination with
F assihi, other related caselaw, and the MRPC, provides valuable lessons for how
attorneys can frame and conduct their representation of closely-held entities to
reduce their potential for liability if these inherently thorny situations arise.
Accordingly, this Article will examine three of these recent cases closely and
then make observations about what these "descendants of Fassihi" say about the
state of the law and how they should impact attorney behavior. To provide
proper context for this discussion, a short summary of Fassihi and other
contemporary responses to the issues raised in Fassihi follows.

1. FASSIHI AND OTHER RESPONSES
A. Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz & Taylor, P.e.
The facts of Fassihi are fairly straightforward. Fassihi, a radiologist, was
one of two fifty percent shareholders of a closely-held professional corporation. s
The corporation formed after Lopez, another radiologist, asked Fassihi to join
him in a medical practice at the hospital with which Lopez was affiliated. After
practicing together for a short time, Lopez decided to cut ties with Fassihi and
asked the corporation's lawyer to determine how Fassihi could be ousted. The
lawyer complied and a meeting of the Board of Directors of the corporation was
purportedly held (without Fassihi present) at which the Board voted to terminate
Fassihi's interest. 9 The Fassihi court noted some skepticism as to whether the
Board could have taken this action, both because Lopez and Fassihi disagreed as
to whether or not the Board had a third director in addition to them, and because

8. Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz & Tyler, P.C., 309 N.W.2d 645, 647
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981).

9. [d.
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it seemed unusual to the court that a board could simply terminate a
stockholder's interest. lO At the very least, however, the action resulted in
hospital officials notifying Fassihi that he was no longer eligible to practice at the
hospital. 11 Unbeknownst to Fassihi, but known to Lopez and the corporation' s
lawyer, membership in the corporation was required for retention of medical staff
privileges at the hospital. 12
Fassihi subsequently sued the corporation's lawyer alleging legal
malpractice, breach of "fiduciary, legal and ethical" duties, and fraud stemming
from the lawyer's participation in Fassihi's ouster. J3 On appeal from the trial
court's denial ofFassihi ' s motion for summary judgment, the Michigan Court of
Appeals addressed the question of whether Fassihi had standing to bring any
individual claims against the law firm, which claimed to represent only the
corporation. The fraud issue aside, the court noted that the case presented it with
a difficult question, "what duties, if any, an attorney representing a closely held
corporation has to a 50% owner of the entity, individually ... a problem of first
impression in Michigan." 14
Although it agreed with the defendant that an attorney for a corporation
represents the corporation and not its shareholders, the court held that the
absence of an attorney-client relationship between a corporation's lawyer and one
of its stakeholders does not preclude the existence of a fiduciary relationship .
between them. 1s Instead, a fiduciary relationship arises whenever
[O]ne reposes faith, confidence, and trust in another' s judgment and
advice. Where a confidence has been betrayed by the party in the
position of influence, this betrayal is actionable and the origin of the
confidence is immaterial. ... [W]hether there exists a confidenti al
relationship ... is a question of fact. 16
Not only might a fiduciary relationship be found, the court noted that such
relationships between lawyers and stakeholders are likely to occur in closely held
corporations "where the number of shareholders is small.,,17 In these instances,
"corporate attorneys, because of their close interaction with a shareholder or
shareholders, simply stand in confidential relationships in respect to both the
corporation and individual shareholders.,,18 Fassihi's simple assertion that he
"believed that, as a 50% shareholder .. . , defendant would treat him with the
same degree of loyalty and impartiality extended to the other shareholder,"19

10. ld. at 647 n.2.
1LId. at 647 .
12. !d.
13. ld. at 646.
14. Id. at 647-48.
15. Id. at 648 .
16. ld. (internal citations omitted).
17 . ld. at 649.
18. ld.
19. Id. at 648 (emphasis added).
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along with the other facts, was sufficient to "tend[ [ to show some legal duty on
the part of the attorney to him personally.,,20
Moreover, Fassihi's allegations regarding the lawyer's behavior-in
particular, his active and covert participation in a plan with one shareholder to
deprive Fassihi of the economic benefit associated with his fifty percent interest
in the coq>oration-seemed to the court to be the type of behavior that would
constitute a breach of duty if a fiduciary relationship existed. Accordingly, the
court of appeals found that it could not dismiss this claim simply as a matter of
law and remanded the case to the trial court. 21
Fassihi is significant for at least two reasons. First, its approach was
distinguishable from a contemporary line of cases in which the central issue in
upholding the claims of the stakeholders of a closely-held corporation against the
entity's attorney was whether the attorney represented the stakeholders as
individuals. 22 Both Fassihi and its contemporaries acknowledged the same
reality, namely, that "treating a closely held coq>oration with few shareholders
as an entity distinct from the shareholders,,23 potentially disregards a
stakeholder's sometimes reasonable perception that the lawyer for the business
is representing his or her interests. But rather than tying up this issue solely in
the question of who the attorney represents, Fassihi recognized the possibility of
a separate fiduciary duty owed to a non-client stakeholder and therefore
potentially created an obligation on the attorney's part in many more
representations .
Fassihi is also significant for the standard it used to determine whether a
fiduciary duty actually existed. Lawyers are considered to owe clients two
primary duties-a duty of care (essentially a duty of competent representation)
and a fiduciary duty (composed of various obligations of confidentiality and
loyalty)?4 A separate line of cases had already established the circumstances
under which non-client stakeholders could assert a breach of the duty of care
against an attorney-by meeting the very narrowly applied "intended
beneficiary" test. 25 Rather than apply this standard, the Fassihi court posited that
a fiduciary relationship existed in this context whenever someone "repose[d]
faith, confidence and trust in another's judgment and advice.,,26 Although the
court did not go into extensive detail about how this standard might be met, it did
connect the standard to the stakeholder's belief of what the relationship entailed
and, simply as stated, the "reposed faith, confidence and trust" standard would
almost certainly be easier for a stakeholder to meet than the "intended
beneficiary" test. Furthermore, it suggested that this type of relationship is

20. Id. at 649 n.6.
21. Id. at 648-50.
22. See, e.?,., In re Conduct of Kinsey, 660 P.2d 660 (Or. 1983); In re Banks, 584 P.2d 284
(Or. 1978).
23. Fassihi, 309 N.W.2d at 649.
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 48,49 (2000).
25. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text for discussion of this test.
26. Fassihi, 309 N.W.2d at 648.
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typical in a lawyer's representation of a closely-held entity. Again, the practical
effect of Fassihi appeared to be the broadening of circumstances under which a
non-client, disgruntled stakeholder could successfully assert a claim against the
entity's attorney.

B. Other Responses to the Fassihi Scenario
Since Fassihi, several courts have recognized the potential for a fiduciary
relationship between the attorney for a closely-held entity and its individual
stakeholders in the absence of an attorney-client relationship.27 This is true not
only in cases addressing the Fassihi Scenario, but also in attorney disqualification
cases where a stakeholder of a business entity has successfully objected to an
adverse party's use of the entity's attorney in litigation involving the
stakeholder. 28 It is fair to say that it is now commonplace for a stakeholder
involved in either type of proceeding to attempt to claim the existence of a
fiduciary relationship with the entity's attorney. Moreover, the circumstances
under which courts have acknowledged that this fiduciary relationship potentially
applies have gone beyond the inherently adverse stakeholder squeeze-out to
include the execution of more routine corporate tasks. 29
At the same time, Fassihi's central proposition has certainly not been
universally accepted. One example is Egan v. McNamara,30 decided shortly after
Fassihi. In Egan, the D .C. Court of Appeals considered a claim of the estate of
a majority shareholder of a close corporation against the corporation's attorney
alleging that the attorney breached a fiduciary duty by not warning the
shareholder about certain aspects of a shareholder's agreement that adversely
affected his interests. 3l The court replied resoundingly that the attorney only had
obligations to the corporation, despite the fact that the attorney had previously
represented the majority shareholder on personal matters: "[T]here was no
fiduciary duty. [The lawyer] represented the corporation, an entity legally
distinct from its directors, and officers, and shareholders. As [the corporation's]

27 . See, e.g. , Johnson v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 312 (App. Ct. 1995) (holding that
lawyer for limited partnership had fiduciary obligations to each of the partners whether or not he
represented them individually); Brennan v. Ruffner, 640 So. 2d 143 (Fla. Dis!. Ct. App. 1994)
(considering claim of fiduciary duty by shareholder of closely-held corporation against
corporation 's attorney) ; Schaeffer v. Cohen, Rosenthal, Price, Mirkin , Jennings, & Berg, P.c. , 541
N.E.2d 997 (Mass. 1989) (noting, in dicta, that there is logic in proposition that lawyer for closely
held corporation owes nonclient shareholders fiduciary duty); Collins v. Telcoa Int'l Corp., 283
A.D.2d 128 (N.Y . App. Div. 2001) (reinstating claim of breach of fiduciary duty by minority
shareholder against corporation's attorney); Arpadi v. First MSP Corp., 628 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio
1994) (finding lawyer for limited partnership owed duties to limited partners).
28. E.g., Marguiles v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985) (holding that law firm ' s
representation of limited partnership gave rise to fiduciary duty with respect to individual partners).
29. See, e.g., Brennan, 640 So. 2d at 143 (negotiation of shareholders' agreement).
30. 467 A.2d 733 (D.C. 1983).
31 . [d. at 738 .
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counsel, his obligation was to ensure that the agreement was in the best interest
of the company, regardless of its impact on individual shareholders.'>32 Several
other courts have found likewise, citing the inevitability of conflicts arising
between the interests of an entity and those of its stakeholders, the impracticality
of an attorney having to consider the interests of a potentially unlimited number
of parties with every entity decision, and the inconsistency of such a duty with
applicable rules of professional conduct. 33
Other courts have appeared willing to consider the claim, but reluctant to find
in favor of the stakeholder notwithstanding compelling facts. A prime example
is Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield. 34 In this case, a California appeals
court overturned a trial court's decision in favor of a twenty-five percent
shareholder (Skarbrevik) of a closely-held corporation who was forced out of the
corporation by the other three shareholders and the corporation's attorney. The
court of appeals found that the facts did not support the existence of a fiduciary
duty owed by the attorney to Skarbrevik, even though the attorney's actions were
at least as detrimental to the ousted shareholder as in Fassihi.35 The attorney
assisted the other shareholders in reneging on a previous offer to buyout
Skarbrevik and then facilitated the amendment of the corporation's Articles of
Incorporation to eliminate Skarbrevik's preemptive right to proportional
participation in stock issuances so that the others could ultimately dilute his
interest. In finding that the corporation's attorney owed duties only to the
corporation and not to individual shareholders, the court specifically
distinguished the facts at hand from Fassihi stating, "the evidence at trial
established no such relationship of trust and confidence between plaintiff and
defendant attorneys which would give rise to a fiduciary duty.,,36
Generally speaking, rules governing attorney behavior do not directly address
the Fassihi Scenario and, in fact, could very well be construed as inconsistent
with Fassihi. Rule 1. 13(a) of the MRPC, which has been adopted in most U.S.
jurisdictions, states that an attorney retained by an organizational client
"represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.',37
Section (e) of Rule 1.13 states that the "lawyer may also represent any of [the

32. ld. at 739.
33 . See, e.g., Rose v. Summers, Compton, Wells & Hamburg, P.C. , 887 S.W.2d 683 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1994) (citing similar litany of reasons for not recognizing fiduciary relationship in this
context) .
34. 282 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Ct. App.1991).
35. ld. at 639.
36 . [d. at 636.
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuer R. 1.13(a) (2003) ; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF' L
RESPONSIBiliTY EC 5-18 (1981), which provides that:
A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his allegiance to
the entity and not to a stockholder .. . or other person connected with the entity. In
advising the entity, a lawyer should keep paramount its interests and his professional
judgment should not be influenced by the personal desires of any person or
organization.
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organization's] directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other
constituents" subject to the Rules governing conflicts of interest, but in no way
implies that the lawyer automatically does represent any of these constituents nor
specifies any circumstances under which the lawyer might be deemed to owe
duties to any individual constituents. 38 In fact, section (d) of Rule 1.i3 explicitly
directs the lawyer to clarify to constituents that he or she represents only the
organization when it is apparent that the "organization's interests are adverse to
those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.,,39 Read literally, Rule
1. 13 seems to say that the lawyer for a closely-held entity must follow the
direction of those constituents authorized to make decisions for the entity,
without concern for whether a particular decision adversely affects the interests
of one or more stakeholders.
In a 1991 formal opinion, the ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Guidance, which is charged with interpreting the MRPC, provided
some additional guidance on these particular aspects of Rule 1.13. 40 Among
other things, Formal Opinion 91-361 clarified that "[a]n attorney-client
relationship does not automatically come into existence between a partnership
lawyer and one or more of its partners," or, by extension, the lawyer and
individual stakeholders of any type of entity.41 It also provided, however, that
sEch a relationship could arise in ways other than just an express agreement
between the lawyer and stakeholder, including where there is evidence of
reliance by the individual stakeholder on the lawyer or of the stakeholder's
expectation of personal representation. Interestingly, the Opinion itself made no
mention of any duties owed by a lawyer to those constituents the lawyer does not
separately represent, however, Fassihi is cited in a footnote for the proposition
that "[i]n small partnerships, as with closely held corporations, ... the likelihood
that the attorney representing the entity will be held to stand in a confidential, or
fiduciary, relationship with the individual shareholders, or partners, is much
greater.,,42 It must be stressed, however, that the Opinion did not specifically
discuss or endorse the position of the Fassihi court, nor did it take a position on
exactly when an attorney representing such an entity owes fiduciary duties to its
stakeholders. In summary, the position of the ABA appears to be that a lawyer
facing a Fassihi Scenario must act in accordance with the wishes of an entity 's
duly authorized constituents and owes no duties of any kind to individual
stakeholders unless he or she has expressly or impliedly agreed to represent them.

38. MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.l3(e).

39. ld. R. 1.13(d).
40. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof! Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-361 (1991).
41. ld.
42. ld. at n.S.
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II. THE RECENT C ASES
A. Cacciola v. Nellhaus43

1. Facts.-This recent Massachusetts case involved a fami ly business- four
brothers who owned equal twenty-five percent interests in a real estate
partnership.44 Although two of the brothers-Edward and Anthony-handled the
day-to-day operations of the business, a written partnership agreement gave all
four equal authority in its management and in partnership decisionmaking. After
Anthony's death, his estate became successor in interest to his partnership share.
Pursuant to the partnership agreement, the partnership had the option to purchase
the share. 45 Although some discussions took place among the remaining brothers
about purchasing the share (including one between Edward and his brother
Salvatore in which they agreed the partnership should buy it), the partnership did
not proceed further with the matter.
A year and a half had passed when Salvatore, to his surprise, "received a
financial statement from the partnership's accountant showing Edward with a
fi fty percent interest in the paltnership.,,46 Edward had purchased Anthony' s
interest from his estate, allegedly at below market value and without notifying the
other partners. To convince the estate to sell to him, Edward allegedly told its
representatives that Salvatore (and presumably his other brother, David) was not
intefested in the share. Edward closed the transaction with the assistance of the
partnership ' S longtime lawyer, Howard NeUhaus. Not only did NeUhaus serve
as lawyer for the transaction, but he advised Edward that Edward had the right
and authority to purchase the share without notice to Salvatore, despite the fact
that the partnership had the first option to buy Anthony' s share.47 When
Salvatore asked NeUhaus for information about the transaction, NeIlhaus refused,
claiming the information was confidential.
Salvatore sued Edward. Soon after, Salvatore died and the executrix of his
estate filed a separate action against Nellhaus asserting what the complaint
termed "malpractice," but which the plaintiff initially described as a violation,
"while purportedly acting as counsel for the partnership, [of! the obligations
[Nellhaus] had as counsel to Salvatore, a partner in the partnership.,,48 Nellhaus
successfully moved to dismiss the malpractice claim on the ground that "as
attorney for the partnership, he owed no enforceable duty to Salvatore.,,49 The
executrix appealed, and the appellate court reversed the tr.al court' s di smissal of
the !'1alpractice claim by reinstating the claim and restating it as a breach of

43. 733 N.E.2d 133 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) .
44. Id. at 135.
45 . Id. at 14l.
46. Id. at 136.
47 . ld
48 . ld.
49. ld.
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fiduciary duty claim.50
2. Analysis.-Ofthe three cases considered by this Article, Cacciola is most
similar to Fassihi. The cases are factually different in that Fassihi involved the
ouster of one fifty percent stockholder by another, while Cacciola involved a
somewhat more benign, "secret" acquisition by one partner of an interest that
should have first been made available to the partnership. As to the issue of the
lawyer's role, however, the cases have conceptual similarities. In both cases, a
disgruntled stakeholder alleged that the lawyer actively assisted another
stakeholder in increasing his ownership of the business at the disgruntled
stakeholder's expense.
Cacciola, like Fassihi, began with the question of whether or not the lawyer
and disgruntled stakeholder had an attorney-client relationship in order to
determine whether or not the stakeholder's estate had a valid claim for legal
malpractice against Nellhaus. 51 Based on the allegations of Salvatore's estate,
the court found neither an express relationship between Salvatore and Nellhaus
nor an instance of Salvatore's having relied upon Nellhaus' s advice which might
give rise to an implied attorney-client relationship.52 The Cacciola court also
specifically distinguished Massachusetts law from cases in other jurisdictions in
which courts have recognized attorney-client relationships between lawyers and
individual stakeholders of small, closely held entities simply by virtue of the
lawyer's representation of the entity.53
After finding the malpractice claim inapplicable, the court could have simply
affirmed the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment. Instead, drawing
upon Fassihi and dicta from a prior Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court case,
Schaeffer v. Cohen, Rosenthal, Price, Mirkin, Jennings, & Berg, P. C. ,54 the court
implied an additional claim for breach of fiduciary duty against NeUhaus from
the estate's complaint. 55 This judicial activism might be read as a determined
effort by the appellate court to address and define a duty alluded to but not
formally upheld in Schaeffer, or as the court's concern that Nellhaus's allegedly
reprehensible behavior might otherwise go unpunished due to poor pleading, or
both. In any event, the court found in F assihi abundant guidance for determining
both whether a fiduciary relationship existed between Salvatore and Nellhaus and
how the accompanying duty might have been breached.
In making the first determination, the Cacciola court quoted directly from
Fassihi:
.
[i]nstances in which the corporation attorneys stand in a fiduciary
relationship to individual shareholders are obviously more likely to

50. [d. at 141.
51. "In order to prove a claim of legal malpractice, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
owed him a duty of care arising from an attorney-client relationship." [d. at 137.
52. Id.
53. [d.
54. 541 N.E.2d 997 (Mass. 1989).
55. Cacciola, 783 N.E.2d at 137.
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arise where the number of shareholders is small. In such [circumstances]
... the corporate attorneys, because of their close interaction with a
shareholder or shareholders, simply stand in confidential relationships
in respect to both the corporation and individual shareholders. 56
Then, noting simply that partnerships are similar to close corporations and that
Salvatore was an equal twenty-five percent partner in the partnership, the court
concluded that NeUhaus may indeed have owed Salvatore a fiduciary duty.57 In
doing so, the court suggested this duty may exist whenever an entity has a small
number of stakeholders. To support this proposition, the court cited dicta in
Schaeffer as standing for the even broader proposition that "an attorney for a
partnership owes a fiduciary duty to each partner.,,58
As for the nature and breach of the duty, the Cacciola court looked first to
the assertions of the plaintiff in Fassihi who claimed that as a fifty percent
shareholder, he trusted that his corporation's lawyer would treat him with "the
same degree of loyalty and impartiality extended to the other shareholder" and
that the lawyer violated this trust by failing to disclose his dual representation of
both the corporation and the other shareholder and by helping to terminate the
plaintiff shareholder's association with the corporation. 59 Linking the facts in
Fassihi to the case at hand, the court then stated:
The allegations set forth in the plaintiff s complaint resemble those at
issue in Fassihi. Salvatore, as an equal twenty-five percent partner,
alleged that "although the defendant ... , as counsel to the partnership,
had obligations to Salvatore, as one of the partners ... to keep Salvatore
informed as to significant transactions affecting the partnership,
nevertheless, [the] defendant . . . did not inform Salvatore about
Edward's negotiations and his subsequent purchase of Anthony's former
interest ..." Moreover, the defendant "refused to provide Salvatore with
any details of the purchase by Edward," ....60
In Cacciola, the fiduciary duty of "loyalty and impartiality" owed by the lawyer
seemed to consist of, at the very least, a duty of disclosure of significant
transactions affecting the entity. Given the size of the Cacciola partnership and
the nature of the estate's allegations regarding the behavior ofNellhaus, the court
found that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty should withstand dismissal. 61
Again, the court could have stopped here. The Fassihi court found a breach
of fiduciary duty claim applicable to both the lawyer's alleged failure to disclose
information that affected the plaintiff/disgruntled stakeholder and his alJeged

56. [d. at 138 (quoting Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz, & Tyler, P.e., 309
N.W.2d 645, 649 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (alterations in original».
57. [d.

58 . [d. at 137 (quoting Schaeffer, 541 N.E.2d at 1002).
59. [d. at 138 (quoting Fassihi, 309 N.w.2d at 648).
60. [d.
61. [d.
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active participation "in terminating plaintiff's association with the corporation"
and using a contract to the plaintiff's detriment. 62 The Cacciola COUlt used the
lawyer' s breach of fiduciary duty to encompass only Nellhaus's failure to
disclose, but suggested a separate theory of liability-"aiding and abetting
Edward 's breach of his fiduciary duty to Salvatore"-that Salvatore's estate
could have asserted to cover NeUhaus's participation in Edward's purchase of
Anthony' s share.63
In explaining the basis for such a claim, the court pointed out that partners
owe to each other a duty of "utmost good faith and loyalty" and even more so in
this case "because of their familial relationship.,,64 Accordingly, Edward owed
Salvatore a fiduciary duty that he breached when he secretly purchased
Anthony's interest. In linking Nellhaus to Edward' s improper behavior, the court
cited Spinner v. Nutt,65 a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court case, for the
circumstances under which a person may be liable for participating in a
fiduciary' s breach. Liability arises when a person "knew of the breach and
actively participated in it such that he or she could not reasonably be held to have
acted in good-faith.,,66 NeUhaus then could be liable not only for the breach of
his own duty to Salvatore, but also for his involvement in Edward's breach of
duty so long as, presumably, he would be unable to demonstrate that he
reasonably believed ~is advice to Edward and his work on the transaction was
appropriate.
Although Cacciola borrowed heavily from Fassihi, it appears that
Massachusetts courts have a significantly more expansive view of attorney
liability in the Fassihi Scenario. According to Cacciola, a lawyer automatically
owes a fiduciary duty to each stakeholder of a client that is a close corporation,
partnership or other similar entity. Furthermore, an attorney encounte11ng a
Fassihi Scenario might also face liability for aiding and abetting one individual
stakeholder's breach of fiduciary duty to another stakeholder, even in the absence
of a relationship with the disgruntled stakeholder.
B. Chern-Age Industries, Inc. v. Glover67

1. Facts.-The most recent of the three cases discussed in this Article is a
South Dakota Supreme Court case which involved a shady business venture
initiated by an entrepreneur named Dahl. Dahl convinced two businessmen,
Pederson and Shepard, to invest in a business he was starting called Chem-Age
Industries. 68 According to their agreement, the investors would contribute cash,

62 . Fassihi, 309 N.W.2d at 648.
63. Cacciola, 733 N.E.2d at 13Q.
64 . l d.
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arrange loans for the business, and serve as its Board of Directors. 6: Dahl would
act as its chief executive officer responsible for day-to-day operations. 70
The investors gave Dahl some money up front in exchange for a promise of
shares, but insisted that Dahl get an attorney to formally set up a corporation
before going any further. 71 Dahl engaged Glover, an attorney with whom he had
worked on various transactions and lawsuits during the previous twenty years,
to do the work?! Glover prepared the necessary paperwork, which listed
Pederson and Shepard as incorporators and Glover as registered agent of the
corporation, and in November 1997, the business was incorporated as Chern-Age
Industries, Inc. ("Chem-Age,,).73 After this, Pederson obtained a large loan for
Chern-Age and the business began purchasing equipment. 74 After handling the
incorporation, Glover acted as Chem-Age' s attorney on at least one other
matter-a lawsuit filed against it-and occasionally held himself out as its
attorney in conversations with outside parties. 75
By early fall of 1998, Pederson and Shepard began to notice that Dahl was
accumulating large balances on company credit cards for what appeared to be
personal expenses and became suspicious that he was swindling them.76 They set
up a meeting with Dahl and Glover at which they were surprised to learn not only
that Dahl and Glover believed Dahl alone owned Chern-Age, but also that the
two were in the process of negotiating the sale of all of the assets of Chern-Age
to another company.77 Dahl told Pederson and Shepard that they would be repaid
for their investments out of the proceeds from the sale of Chem-Age's assets .78
Needless to say, litigation ensued against both Dahl and Glover. The suit
against Glover, brought by Chern-Age as an entity and Pederson and Shepard
individually, asserted several different claims including legal malpractice and
breach offiduciary duty.79 Glover moved successfully for summary judgment on
these two claims on the ground that he had only represented Dahl and, therefore,
owed no duties to Pederson, Shepard or Chem-Age.8o Glover maintained that
shortly after incorporation Dahl had told him that Pederson and Shepard were no
longer interested in the business and that Dahl would run Chern-Age as a sole
proprietorshipY The plaintiffs appealed raising several questions relating to the
nature of the duties Glover owed to them and whether Glover had breached any
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of the duties owed. 82
2. Analysis.-The Chern-Age court's first task in addressing what duties
Glover owed, and to whom, was to attempt to sort out exactly who Glover
represented. After considering Glover's role in setting up the corporation and the
fact that he continued to perform work and occasionally held himself out as
working on behalf of Chern-Age after its incorporation, the court was persuaded
that Glover may have represented the corporation and that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment to the contrary.B3 The court was unpersuaded,
however, by Pederson and Shepard's assertion that Glover represented each of
them individually because Glover simply had too little direct contact with them
for either to have reasonably believed he was represented by Glover.
Accordingly, the court found that Glover may have owed duties arising from an
attorney-client relationship to Chern-Age, but not to the investors. 84
While more could be written just on these findings, what makes Chern-Age
important for purposes of this Article is the considerable time the court spent
discussing three "nonclient," fiduciary-based claims Pederson and Shepard might
have had against Glover as Chem-Age's attorney. The first, which the court
termed a Nonclient Third-Party Beneficiary claim, was technically a claim for
negligence (i.e. a breach of duty of care), and not breach of a fiduciary duty.85
However, it is worth considering here, given the context in which it was
brought-Pederson and Shepard were not really questioning Glover's
competence in incorporating Chern-Age, but rather his failure to protect them as
constituents of the entity. In this way, this claim is very similar to the fiduciary
claims brought in other cases considered herein. 86 In fact, it is not uncommon for
stakeholders suing entity attorneys to use negligence claims to encompass breach
of fiduciary duty claims and vice-versa. 87
In essence, the Nonclient Third Party Beneficiary theory provides that in
certain circumstances a lawyer owes a duty of care to a nonclient when the
nonclient is either invited or intended to benefit from the lawyer's services to his
or her client. 88 In the case at hand, Pederson and Shepard might claim that they
were invited to rely individually on Glover's services to the corporation or that
Dahl intended that Glover's representation benefit them primarily and could then
assert a valid legal malpractice claim against Glover.
While the Chern-Age court was intrigued enough by this theory of liability
to spill considerable ink discussing it, the court ultimately found that Pederson
and Shepard had not presented sufficient evidence to support it as a technical
matter under the standards set forth for such a claim in section 51 of the

82. [d. at 763.
83. Id. at 768.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 769.
86. Third party negligence claims were also asserted by the plaintiffs in Cacciola, supra Part
II.A, and Richter v. Vall Amberg, supra Part n.c.
87 . RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GoVERNlNG LAWYERS § 49 cmt. c (2000).
8R.ld.§51.
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Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. 89 Clearly, other concerns
also influenced the court's decision. The court laid out several policy reasons to
explain the court's reluctance to relax the rule of strict privity in attorney
malpractice cases:
First, the rule preserves an attorney's duty of loyalty to and effective
advocacy for the client .... Second, adding responsibilities to nonclients
creates the danger of conflicting duties .... Third, once the privity rule
is relaxed, the number of persons a lawyer might be accountable to could
be limitless .... Fourth, a relaxation of the strict privity rule would
imperil attorney-client confidentiality.90
These policy reasons are nearly identical to the ones cited in cases rejecting the
availability of a breach of fiduciary claim in the Fassihi Scenario. The court also
looked at the nature of the services Glover provided-primarily setting up the
corporation-and contrasted it with a scenario where instead of just preparing
paperwork, he was called upon to advise and warn "individual constituents of all
the consequences and dangers inherent in investing in a corporation.,,91
Considering Glover's role and contact with Pederson and Shepard, the court did
not see justification for providing them with a legal malpractice claim.92
Next, the court turned to whether Glover owed and breached a fiduciary duty
to Pederson and Shepard even though he did not represent them. At the outset,
it stated that no South Dakota court had previously recognized the claim of
breach of fiduciary duty "involving lawyers and nonclients," although it
acknowledged that other jurisdictions had, including some "in the corporate
sphere.,,93 As an example, the court cited Fassihi. 94 While not discrediting
Fassihi, the test the Chern-Age court found in South Dakota caselaw for
determining whether a fiduciary duty existed was significantly more extensive
than Fassihi's "reposed trust and confidence" standard:
To ascertain a fiduciary duty, we must find three things: (1) plaintiffs
reposed "faith, confidence and trust" in Glover, (2) plaintiffs were in a
position of "inequality, dependence, weakness, or lack of knowledge"
and, (3) Glover exercised "dominion, control or influence" over
plaintiffs' affairs. 95
Perhaps because of this, the court found no fiduciary relationship between Glover
and the stakeholders. "Pederson and Shepard have submitted no evidence to
show how they were in a confidential relationship with Glover, where they
depended on him specifically to protect their investment interests, and where
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Glover exercised dominance and influence over their business affairs."9AFurther,
"[a]side from simple avowals that they believed Glover was watching out for
their interests, their claim that Glover was entrusted with explicit responsibility
for their investments is 'factually unsupported. ",97 In analyzing the stakeholders'
claim in this way, Chem-Age differs sharply from Cacciola, which seemed to
imply that a fiduciary duty extending from the lawyer to stakeholders exists
whenever a lawyer represents a closely held entity. It differs from Fassihi as
well not only by using a more exacting standard, but by requiring evidence of
reliance beyond just simple avowals. Fassihi' s appeal might very well have been
unsuccessful had it been judged by the Chem-Age court.
Glover, however, was not out of the woods yet. As in Cacciola, the Chem
Age court moved immediately on to consider whether Glover might be liable for
"aiding and abetting" a breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the disgruntled
stakeholders by Dahl, even though Pederson and Shepard apparently never
alleged this themselves. 98 Once again, the Chem-Age court used a different and
arguably more onerous standard. While the Cacciola court had prior state
caselaw to rely upon, Chem-Age looked instead to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 876(b), which provides generally that "[flor harm resulting to a
third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he
knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial
assistance or encouragement to the other,,,99 and to Granewich v. Harding,100 a
1999 Oregon Supreme Court case which applied this Restatement provision to
the Fassihi Scenario. 101 In Granewich, the attorney helped controlling
shareholders squeeze out a minority shareholder by advising and assisting them
to take certain steps specifically designed to dilute the minority shareholder' s
interest (for example, amending the corporation's bylaws to eliminate certain
voting requirements that protected the minority shareholder's interest from
dilution).lo2 The Granewich court overturned a lower court's decision that the
minority shareholder could not bring a claim for aiding and abetting the majority
shareholders' breach of their fiduciary duty to him against the attorney in "the
absence of any duty flowing directly from the lawyers to plaintiff.",o3
The Chem-Age court had no difficulty finding that Dahl's behavior, as
alleged by the plaintiffs, clearly breached fiduciary obligations Dahl owed to the
company and its investors. lo4 Nor did the court have much doubt that material
questions of fact existed as to whether Glover substantially assisted Dahl in
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breaching those obligations. 105 Its concern, again policy-driven, was whether it
was wise to hold Glover partially responsible for Dahl's use of his services.
Holding attorneys liable in this way, the court posited, "poses both a hazard and
a quandary for the legal profession.,,106 Echoing the concerns it expressed earlier
when considering the Nonclient Third Party Beneficiary claim, the court
cautioned that overbroad liability for attorneys could affect the quality of legal
services in this context, as attorneys might modify, or refrain from providing,
advice on matters that affect the rights of third parties. 107 These "self protective
reservations" hurt the attorney's client by depriving it of competent, unfettered
advice from its legal counsel. 108 At the same time, the court acknowledged that
the right to unfettered advice is not an absolute one-"iawyers should not be free
to substantially assist their clients in committing tortious acts.,,109
The court concluded that these competing concerns could be reconciled
through the strict application of Restatement section 876. First, section 876
requires that the attorney "substantially" assist or encourage a breach of the
fiduciary duty. 110 To be implicated, the attorney must provide "substantial
assistance" to the actual breach of the duty-merely acting as a scrivener or
providing routine legal services to someone who then uses them to breach a duty
is insufficient. 11l As an example, the court noted that in Granewich the lawyer
did more than just advise the controlling shareholders about their options but
actually participated in the wrongful acts by making misrepresentations and
amending the bylaws in a way that violated the law.1I 2 Second, the attorney must
know-actually or constructively-of the fiduciary's role as fiduciary and that
the fiduciary's conduct "contravenes a fiduciary duty.,,113 Constructive
knowledge might suffice especially when the aider and abettor have maintained
a long-term or in-depth relationship with the fiduciary. 114 When applied
correctly, the court believed that the standard would protect a lawyer from
meritless claims by every stakeholder disadvantaged by the lawyer's advice. I J5
In the aiding and abetting claim, the Chern-Age court at last found a hook on
which Pederson and Shepard could potentially hang their hats. Given the facts
at hand, the court found that Glover's p31ticipation in the formation of the
corporation, acquiescence in Dahl ' s treatment of the business as a one-man
operation, and his long term relationship with Dahl, provided reason enough to
proceed further on the questions of whether Glover knew or should have known

105. Id. at 776.
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of Dahl's fiduciary duty to the duped investors and whether he substantially
assisted in the breach of that duty.116 This holding then suggests, as Granewich
did, an alternative way to find an attorney liable to stakeholders she does not
represent and to whom she does not owe a fiduciary duty. The Chern-Age court's
measured and careful review of three separate nonclient, fiduciary-based claims
makes it an important update to Fassihi.

C. Richter v. Van Amberg 117
1. Facts.-At issue in this New Mexico federal district court case were the
actions of a lawyer who represented a real estate development partnership called
Santa Fe Partners II ("SFP"). SFP had two, clearly unequal, partners-Gibbens
and Richter. Gibbens provided most of the capital for the venture and
consequently was largely in control. SFP's partnership agreement designated
Gibbens as the managing partner and provided that Richter was entitled to twenty
percent of the partnership's profits only after Gibbens had recovered his initial
investment. 118
The opinion in this case does not set forth the rest of the facts very clearly.
What is clear, however, is that the relationship between Gibbens and Richter
ultimately began to fracture. Gibbens believed that Richter had deceived him in
taking an undisclosed commission on certain property, presumably associated .
with the partnership and was also disappointed by Richter's general
performance. 119 Gibbens approached the partnership's lawyer, Van Amberg,
about representing him personally and, in the course of so doing, expressed his
dissatisfaction with Richter and his desire to dissolve SFP to avoid paying
Richter any profits. 120 Van Amberg declined to represent Gibbens, citing his
obligations to SFP as an entity, but continued to represent the partnership and
said nothing to Richter. 121
Subsequent to this, Van Amberg facilitated a sale of some of the
partnership's property (the "MAH Sale"). Gibbens insisted that it be done
without Richter's knowledge or consent and technically, Richter's consent was
not required under SFP's partnership agreement. 122 When Richter's consent to
the MAH Sale later became necessary to complete its closing (and presumably
Richter objected because he had not yet received any profits from the venture),
Van Amberg brokered an accommodation between Richter ~nd Gibbens which
allowed the sale to go forward. 123 After the MAH Sale, Gibbens sued to dissolve
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SFP. 124 Richter counterclaimed and the partners ultimately settled the dissolution
of the partnership when Richter accepted payment of $110,000. 125
The case at issue arose out of claims Richter later asserted against Van
Amberg, after learning that Gibbens and Van Amberg had spoken about
Gibbens' s plans to dissolve SFP prior to the MAH Sale. Richter sued Van
Amberg asserting a catalog of claims, including legal malpractice, breach of
fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty. 126 Underlying
all of Richter's claims were his contentions that Van Amberg facilitated the
MAH Sale while aware that Gibbens wanted to terminate the partnership without
compensating Richter and failed to disclose this to Richter. Richter claimed he
would not have agreed to the MAH Sale had he known Gibbens' intentions. 127
Van Amberg countered that Richter's contentions did not amount to any
. wrongdoing on Van Amberg's part and moved for judgment as a matter of law. 128
Van Amberg claimed that Gibbens, as SFP' s managing partner, had full authority
under the partnership agreement over partnership matters, without any right of
consent by Richter, and, therefore, Van Amberg only owed a duty of disclosure
to Gibbens. 129 Moreover, Van Amberg claimed that ethical rules prohibited him
from disclosing what he learned about Gibbens's desire to dissolve the
partnership to Richter because it was a communication by a person "who consults
a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services.,,1 30
2. Analysis.-The Richter court granted Van Amberg's motion, agreeing
that, even assuming Richter's version of the facts, there was no legally sufficient
basis to support a finding for Richter on any of his claims. 131 What is distinctive
about the Richter opinion, especially when compared with Cacciola and Fassihi,
is its analytical approach to determining whether Van Amberg owed a fiduciary
duty to Richter. In concluding he did not, the court never contemplated that a
fiduciary relationship might exist between the two, separate and apart from an
attorney-client relationship. In this way, Richter bears very little resemblance to
Fassihi. The fact that the Richter court employed several different and
contradictory tests for determining Van Amberg's obligations to Richter,
however, prevents it from representing a clear alternative to the Fassihi
approach.
It is significant that the Richter court began its analysis of Richter' s breach
of fiduciary duty claim by quoting from a treatise on legal malpractice-"[the]
breach of fiduciary duty claim is also one for legal malpractice.,,132 For in this

124. [d.
125. [d.

126. [d. at 1255-56.
127. /d. at 1259.

128 .
129.
130.
131.
132.

Supp.» .

[d. at 1258.
[d. at 1259.
/d. at 1262.
Id.atI258.
ld. at 1261 (citing 2 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 14.1.5 (4th ed. 1998

196

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1 77

court's OpInIOn, such a claim was inextricably tied to an attorney-client
relationship. For Richter, this meant the court would not recognize his claim for
breach of fiduciary duty against Van Amberg unless Richter demonstrated an
attorney-client relationship existed between them.
The court provided support for this approach, and distanced itself from
Fassihi, by citing two recent New Mexico cases in which courts had held that the
attorney for a closely-held entity owed no special duties to its constituents by
virtue of that representation . J33 Most compelling was the deci.sion in Delta
Automatic Systems, Inc. v. Bingham,134 a 1998 case, in which the court
considered claims by the two sole shareholders of a corporation that the
corporate attorney owed them a special duty because he represented them in
matters apart from the corporation. The court stated unequivocally: "In
representing Delta, Defendants did not owe the Quintanas, as shareholders, any
special duty above and beyond their duties to the corporation. This is so even
though the Quintanas were the sole shareholders of Delta and Defendants knew
that the Quintanas' livelihood depended on Delta's success."135 Had the Richter
court stopped here, we could simply assume that New Mexico law on this issue
is similar to other jurisdictions which have concluded that attorneys owe no
fiduciary or other duties to the stakeholders of a closely-held entity absent
evidence of a separate attorney-client relationship between them.
Instead, however, the Richter court also pointed to Rice v. Stntnk,136 a 1996
decision of the Indiana Supreme Court, which provided that partnerships should
be treated differently than corporations for purposes of determining who the
attorney represents, as guidance in reaching its decision. This approach, while
contrary to Rule 1.13 of the MRPC and the law in the vast majority of U.S.
jurisdictions, is still followed in a few states . It employs the aggregate, rather
than entity, theory of representation when analyzing a lawyer's representation of
a partnership and other unincorporated associations, holding that an attorney who
represents a partnership actually represents each partner jointly rather than the
partnership as an entity. As the court in Rice noted, however, pursuant to
partnership law, partners may essentially contract away this fiduciary and legal
relationship with the entity's attorney by entering into a partnership agreement
that delegates their rights to the management of the partnership to a manager or
managing partner. 137 Following this logic, the Richter court found that, indeed,
Richter might have had individual claims against Van Amberg had he not entered
into a partnership agreement with Gibbens delegating full goveming authority on
all partnership matters to Gibbens. 138 Because he did so, the court reasoned, Van
Amberg's fiduciary obligations of confidentiality and undivided loyalty fl owed
directly to the partnership as represented by its managing partner and not to

133 .
134.
135 .
136.
137 .
138 .

Id. at 1263.
974 P.2d 1174 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 1178 (cited in Richler, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1263-64).
670 N.E.2d 1280 (Ind 1996).
[d. at 1288-89.
Richler, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.

2005]

THE DESCENDANTS OF FASSIHI

197

either of the partners individually.139
This purely contractarian approach differs from Fassihi in which such
ohligations are not automatically bestowed upon stakeholders, but created
through the relationship that the individual stakeholder has with the attorney.
However, it also is clearly inconsistent with the Richter court' s simultaneous use
of Delta as controlling precedent.
In the absence of a fiduciary relationship with Richter, Van Amberg's
!Jehavior, which initially might have appeared problematic, is viewed in a
different light. The law only imposed on him a duty to his client-the
partnership. Citing New Mexico's version of Model Rule l.13, the court stated,
"As the partnership lawyer, Mr. Van Amberg's responsibility was to the entity,
specifically the managing partner."140 Therefore, Van Amberg's "secret"
facilitatIOn of the MAH Sale was not wrongful as Gibbens, pursuant to the
partnership agreement, "had the authority to convey partnership real
property ... on behalf of the partnership without Plaintiff Richter's consent.,,141
Van Amberg's non-disclosure of Gibbens's intent to dissolve the partnership
without giving Richter any profits was also appropriate because Van Amberg
only had a duty of disclosure to the partnership, not individual partners. Further,
and perhaps more plausibly, because Gibbens disclosed it in the course of
requesting Van Amberg to represent him personally, it was a confidential
attorney-client communication. 142
Clearly, the Richter court was convinced that the facts, as much as the law,
justified its decision in this case. Even under Richter's version of the facts, the
court believed that Van Amberg' s behavior lined up with applicable professional
standards. Richter and Gibbens were both sophisticated businessmen who
retained separate counsel during their disputes. 143 When Gibbens approached
Van Amberg about personal representation, Van Amberg declined and told
Gibbens to retain separate counsel. 144 When Van Amberg participated in the
negotiations between Richter and Gibbens it was at the request of Richter' s
counsel. 145 Towards the end of its opinion, the court revealed an unwillingness
to drag Van Amberg into Richter's sour break-up with Gibbens. It noted that
both Gibbens and Richter "had colorable claims against one another for breach
of fiduciary duty" and "have strong personalities" and "it is highly unlikely that
Mr. Van Amberg could have predicted what either would do regarding their
ongoing partnership disputes.,,146 Accordingly, the court quickly dispensed of
Richter's final claim that the lawyer aided and abetted Gibbens's breach of
fiduciary duty to Richter, noting again that Van Amberg's actions met
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professional standards and that "no evidence suggests that Mr. Van Amberg's
non-disclosure was the proximate cause of damages to Plaintiff Richter." 147
At the end of the day, it is difficult for the reader to decipher on what
principle the Richter decision rests. Was it that Van Amberg, as lawyer for the
partnership, owed no duties to Richter, that Richter contracted away any duties
Van Amberg owed to him, that Van Amberg's adherence to applicable
professional standards absolved him of liability, or some combination of these
three? The answer is unclear. Notwithstanding, this case is significant for its
discussion of several approaches to the question of the existence of a fiduciary
duty in the Fassihi Scenario not discussed in Fassihi, Cacciola or Chern-Age.

m.

LESSONS LEARNED

So what helpful guidance might be gleaned from these "descendants of
Fassihi" for those who represent closely held businesses? Interests among
business partners frequently diverge and most significant decisions a business
makes have the potential to affect constituents differently. Must lawyers in this
arena practice with an excess of caution, with one eye constantly on the
stakeholder who is getting the short end of the stick?
A. Where Does the Law Stand?

The initial question posed by this Article was: Under what circumstances is
a lawyer who represents a closely held entity potentially susceptible to fiduciary
type claims asserted by individual, nonclient stakeholders? The cases analyzed
in Part II demonstrate that there still is no uniformity of opinion on this issue.
This is especially true with the respect to the narrower question of how widely
has Fassihi's central proposition been accepted. At one end of the spectrum is
a case like Cacciola in which the language ofthe court's opinion insinuates that
a lawyer owes a fiduciary duty to non-client stakeholders whenever the lawyer
represents a closely-held entity. At the other end of the spectrum is the Richter
court which, apparently, would not recognize a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
in the absence of an established attorney-client relationship. Somewhere in the
middle is Chern-Age which, like Fassihi, requires the demonstration of a
relationship of trust, not quite arising to the level of an attorney-client
relationship. Even on the question of what constitutes a relationship of trust,
courts apply varying standards as a comparison of Chern-Age and Fassihi
indicates. The recent cases are representative of the diversity of viewpoints
expressed by courts that have considered this claim during the twenty years since
the Fassihi decision. 148

147. [d.
148. E.g., Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Ct. App. 1991)
(considering breach of fiduciary claim but finding absence of relationship of trust between lawyer
and constituent); Rose v. Summers, Compton, Bells, & Hamberg, P.e., 887 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1994) (finding lawyer for limited partnership not liable and owed no fiduciary duty to limited
partners); Arpadi v. MSP Corp., 628 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio 1994) (finding lawyer for limited
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An important corollary issue for those jurisdictions which acknowledge the
existence of a fiduciary duty in this context is: what does the duty consist of?
Is it identical to the fiduciary duty lawyers owe clients, less comprehensive or
altogether different? The fiduciary duty resulting from an attorney-client
relationship is really an amalgam of several separate obligations, including
"safeguarding the client's confidences and property; avoiding impermissible,
conflicting interests; dealing honestly with the client; adequately informing the
client; following instructions of the client; and not employing adversely to the
client powers arising from the client-lawyer relationship."149 The limited
treatment this issue has received suggests that the duty owed to a nonclient
stakeholder closely resembles that owed to a client. In Cacciola, the duty
encompassed NeUhaus's (the attorney) failure to deal honestly with Salvatore by
not informing him "about Edward's negotiations and his subsequent purchase of
Anthony's former interest.,,15o In Fassihi, it was the lawyer's behavior in acting
to deplete Fassihi's property (i.e. his economic interest in the corporation).151
The Chem-Age court discussed the fiduciary duty to a nonclient as though it were
the duty owed to a client. 152 Other cases and the Restatement have insinuated the
same.
One way in which the three recent cases stand apart from Fassihi, which is
also an indication of how the jurisprudence has developed, is that they each
address a separate, additional claim: the attorney's 'aiding and abetting' of
another stakeholder in breaching his fiduciary duty to the plaintiff. This is not
because the facts in Fassihi are less compelling than the other cases for such a
claim, but rather because it is only in the last twenty years that courts have begun
to recognize the liability of an attorney for this tort. 153 In fact, it is only since
Granewich v. Harding, 154 a 1999 decision of the Oregon Supreme Court, that this
type of claim was upheld in a case involving the Fassihi Scenario. Granewich
is partially distinguishable from Fassihi, because it involved an attorney who
began representation of a corporation only after the majority shareholders had
commenced the plan to oust the minority shareholder. The minority shareholder
had no direct contact with the attorney and therefore could not reasonably claim
that he had established a relationship of trust and confidence with the attorney.
This distinction, however, certainly did not stop the Cacciola, Chem-Age, and
Riehle r courts from considering an aiding and abetting claim, in two of the cases

partnership owed duties to limited partners).
149. REsTATEMENT (THiRD) OFTHE LAW GoVERNINO LAWYERS § 49 cmt. b (2000) (internal
references omitted).
150. Cacciola v. Nellhaus, 733 N.E.2d 133, 138 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000).
151. Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz & Tyler, P.C., 309 N.W.2d 645, 646
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
152. Chern-Age Indus., Inc. v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756 (S .D. 2(02).
153. Bryan C. Barksdale, Note, Redefining Obligation in Close Corporation Fiduciary
Representation: Attorney Liability for Aiding and Abetting the Breach of Fiduciary Duty in
Squeeze-Outs, 58 WASH & LEE L. REv. 551, 554 (2001).
154. 985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999). See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
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even when the plaintiffs had not initially pleaded it.
The presence of the aiding and abetting claim in the above cases represents
a clear, recent trend of courts towards treating it not only as complimentary to the
more direct breach of fiduciary duty claim, but, perhaps in many instances, as a
better way to determine an attomey's liability in the Fassihi Scenario. There are
several possible reasons for this. First, caselaw is better developed as to what
duties majority stakeholders owe to minority stakeholders than it is as to what
duties an attorney for a closely-held entity owes to individual nonclient
stakeholders. Because many Fassihi Scenario cases involve a concomitant
breach of duty by a majority stakeholder, the court can move directly on to the
more concrete inquiry of whether the attomey knowingly participated in the
majority stakeholder' s breach rather than having to address whether a fiduciary
relationship existed between the attorney and the disgruntled stakeholder and
whether the attomey's actions violated this relationship. Along these lines, and
as has already been demonstrated above, jurisdictions differ significantly on
whether or not, and when, attorneys owe fiduciary duties to nonclients. The
aiding and abetting claim addresses the attorney's reprehensible behavior
notwithstanding the court's position on these other issues. Finally, as one
commentator recently pointed out, liability for breach of a fiduciary duty does
not require a mental state and is therefore essentially a strict liability claim. ISS
To be liable for aiding and abetting someone else's breach, one must have done
so knowingly and therefore this claim may better fit scenarios like those in all
three of the recent cases in which the plaintiff seeks redress against the attomey
for affirmatively and intentionally acting against his interest.
In summary, whether or not, as well as when, an attorney is susceptible to
fiduciary claims in this context continues to be largely dependant upon the
jurisdiction in which the attorney practices. It appears, however, that in a
growing number of jurisdictions, a lawyer embroiled in a Fassihi Scenario will
be susceptible to liability if she knowingly and substantially assists one or more
stakeholders in breaching their fiduciary duties to another stakeholder. Other
attempts to extend fiduciary type liability, like the nonclient third party
beneficiary claim alleged in all three of the recent cases, have generaliy failed .

B. Possible Responses by the Attorney
Given the judicial uncertainty, it is tempting to seek a straightforward,
failsafe answer to this thorny representational dilemma. One particularly risk
averse approach would be for the lawyer to simply not involve herself in matters
that adversely impact the interests of one or more stakeholders. This might
involve declining to accept representation of closely held businesses where the
interests of stakeholders appear to be even remotely at odds, refusing to advise
an entity client (including its control group) on decisions that could negatively
affect one or more stakeholders and recommending that all affected constituents
seek separate counsel whenever any intracorporate dispute arises.

--------------------------_._._
155 . Barksdale, supra note 153, at 559.

. .. 
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Another possible approach would be for the lawyer to attempt to consider
and reconcile the interests of an entity and eash of its stakeholders on all
decisions . This utilizes the "group" or "aggregate" theory of organizational
representation, which some legal commentators and courts have asserted (as
Cacciola implicitly does) is appropriate when lawyers represent closely held
entities. 156 In essence, this approach requires that the lawyer treat each
stakeholder as a co-client pursuant to Model Rule 1.7 and refrain from further
representation if the interests of these co-clients are "fundamentally
antagonistic." Because the lawyer would owe representational duties to each
stakeholder, when faced with a potential Fassihi Scenario, she could not assist
an entity or control group in taking action adverse to anyone stakeholder.
While accomplishing the lawyer's objective of reducing fiduciary liability
exposure, these approaches both raise legal and practical problems. The most
fundamental of these is that neither approach comports with the "entity" theory
of representation embodied in Model Rule 1.13, and its Model Code counterpart
BC 5-18, which together are the basis for the standards for professional conduct
adopted in every state pertaining to a lawyer's representation of an organization.
The selection of the "entity" theory over the "aggregate" theory by the drafters
of the MRPC followed from their conclusions that the former had supplanted the
latter in jurisdictions throughout the United States and that treating stakeholders
as co-agents of the entity rather than co-clients more accurately reflects basic
principles of corporate law. IS? ABA Formal Opinion 91-361 clarified that these
principles and the entity theory applies equally to partnerships, closely held
entities and other types of associations as it does to corporations. 158 Inherent
within Rule 1.13 is the notion that the lawyer, in following the will of the entity
as expressed by its "duly authorized constituents," may assist in a course of
action adverse to one or more of the entity's stakeholders. 159
As a practical matter, following either of the two approaches discussed above
as a general rule would hinder a lawyer's ability to meaningfully and effectively
represent closely held business clients. Under either approach, the lawyer would
have to tailor her advice to omit the discussion of options that could potentially
negatively impact a stakeholder and thus would deprive an entity client of an
opportunity to fully consider all options and make fully informed decisions. The
"risk-averse" approach would require identifying all situations in which interests
potentially diverge-ranging from inherently contentious ones, like the decision

156. " Reality inhibits application of the entity representation rule of the closed corporation ."
WUNNICKE, supra note 4, at 232; see also Lawrence Mitchell, Professional Responsibility and the

Close Corporation: Toward A Realistic Ethic, 74 CORNELLL. REv. 466 (1989).
157. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W . WILLIAM HODES, LAW AND LAWYERING 17.6 to
17.13 (3d ed. 2001).
158. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-361 (199 1).
159. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003) (requiring lawyer to explain to
constituent that entity is client when lawyer is "deaJing with" constituent against whom entity' s
interests are adverse).
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to involuntarily buyout a minority shareholder, to more apparently mundane
tasks like the preparation of organizational documents that supposedly express
the agreement of stakeholders-and then recusing herself. 160 It is hard to believe
a lawyer could ever identify all such situations or that a client would find it
valuable to retain a lawyer who did. In the same vein, while under certain
circumstances it is either advisable or required that a lawyer for a business
recommend that constituents at odds with one another consult separate counsel,
in many cases, it is neither required nor helpful to do so, especially when
considering the attendant costs, both financial and otherwise, of adding more
lawyers to the fray.
Although assisting an entity client to reconcile the interests of its
stakeholders is sometimes in the entity's best interests, a purely "aggregate"
approach to corporate representation is often unfeasible. Because the lawyer
owes duties to multiple clients rather than one, the potential for pervasive and
numerous conflicting duties increases with each additional stakeholder.
Ostensibly, the lawyer owes obligations of confidentiality to each stakeholder
and to the entity itself, which could make communications with anyone
stakeholder a potential minefield. Additionally, as previously mentioned, the
lawyer may feel compelled to impose self protective restrictions on her advice
to avoid any chance of impairing one client's interests, which ultimately hinders
the development of an open, trustworthy relationship between the lawyer and
entity.

C. A Case-by-Case Strategy for Reducing Exposure to Fiduciary Liability
A more appropriate response for containing fiduciary liability should be
firmly rooted in applicable caselaw and professional standards. To this end, the
recent cases examined in this Article are quite instructive.
The recent cases suggest that the course of dealing that the attorney and
client engage in is often a very important factor. For example, in Chern-Age,
Pederson and Shepard's claim of a fiduciary relationship with Glover failed
because there was "no evidence to show how they were in a confidential
relationship with Glover, where they depended on him specifically to protect
their investment interests, and where Glover exercised dominance and influence
over their business affairs.,,'61 Simple avowals that they believed Glover was
watching out for their interests were insufficient absent evidence "that Glover
was entrusted with explicit responsibility for their investments."'62
Similarly, in dismissing the notion that Van Amberg owed any duties to
Richter individually, the Richter court looked to their interactions and found no
specific evidence of Richter's reliance on Van Amberg in partnership matters;

160. See Brennan v. Ruffner, 640 So. 2d 143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (considering claim that
lawyer breached fiduciary duty to shareholder in preparation of shareholders agreement); see also
Egan v. McNamara, 467 A.2d 733 (D.C. 1983) (same).
161. Chern-Age Indus., Inc. v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756, 773 (S.D. 2002).
162. ld.
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in fact, Richter retained separate counsel to protect his interests during his
negotiations with Gibbens. 163 The court found Van Amberg's response to
Gibbens's request for personal representation telling of how he viewed his
relationship with the stakeholders-he declined and referred Gibbens to outside
counsel, stating that he could only represent the partnership.l64 Later, he urged
Gibbens to disclose certain partnership matters to Richter.
Cacciola, with its insinuation that a fiduciary relationship between an
attorney and stakeholder of a closely held entity might be inherent, did not
explore how the partners of Cacciola Associates perceived NeUhaus nor point to
this as a factor. In a few jurisdictions, course of dealing will not be a factor. One
other case, however, is instructive. In Brennan v. Rujner, a Florida appeals court
affinned the dismissal of a claim of breach of fiduciary duty by a "disgruntled
minority shareholder" against the attorney of a closely-held corporation, after the
corporation's other two shareholders voted the minority shareholder out of the
corporation using a procedure agreed upon in their shareholders agreement. 165
In concluding that the attorney did not have a fiduciary relationship with the
disgruntled shareholder resulting from his preparation of the shareholders
agreement, the court found persuasive the fact that the attorney had told the
shareholders that he only represented the corporation in drafting the agreement. 166
Defining upfront the nature of the attorney's relationship with the constituents
of an entity client is also consistent with several sections of the MRPC, including
Rule 1.2 (c), Rule 1.7 and Rule 1.13 (d).
For the most part, the logic in these cases closely resembles the "reasonable
expectations" approach adopted in most jurisdictions and by the ABA for dealing
with the closely related issue of determining whether an attorney and an
individual stakeholder have established a separate attorney-client relationship. 167
This approach looks at the facts of each particular case to determine whether an
express or implied relationship has arisen based on the stakeholder's reasonable
expectation of the role of the attorney, including whether "there was evidence of
reliance by the individual [stakeholder] on the lawyer as his or her separate
counsel, or of the [stakeholder's] expectation of personal representation.,,168
Similarly then, an attorney who would like to proactively decrease the likelihood
of creating a fiduciary relationship with individual stakeholders should address
this issue at the beginning of a representation by clearly stating to each that the
attorney will only represent the interests of the business entity and not those of
any of the individual stakeholders. This would best be taken care of in writing,

163. Richter v. Van Amberg, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1265 (D.N.M. 2000).
164. ld. at 1262.
165. Brennan, 640 So. 2d at 143.
166. ld. at 146-47; see also Buehler v. Sbardellati, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 104, 108 (1995)
(upholding lawyer's limitation of role in formation of limited partnership to merely documenting
transaction and not representation of each partner's individual interests).
167. See ABA Conun. on Ethics and Prof! Responsibility, Formal Op. 91 -361 (1991).
168. ld.
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ideally in an engagement letter. 169 For the risk averse attorney, the letter could
gc. even further and provide that undertaking the engagement in no way creates
any type of a fiduciary relationship with any of the stakeholders.
Of course, putting this in writing is one thing and following it is quite
another. As several commentators have noted, it is often difficult in the course
of representing a closely held entity to separate the entity and its stakeholders. 170
But difficult does not mean impossible. The attorney who wishes to rebut a
future contention that she has a fiduciary relationship with any of the entity ' s
stakeholders would be well advised to adhere to "corporate"/"entity" formalities.
These formalities include somewhat mundane, yet important, practices like
ensuring that direction given by a constituent of the client is consistent with the
constituent' s authority and has been properly approved by the entity, insisting
that constituents adhere to rules and procedures set fort in the entity's governance
documents and applicable law and even reinforcing that the entity is the client
when communicating with constituents (e.g., by addressing letters to constituents
in their official capacities). They also include obeying requirements directly
imposed by the MRPC such as explaining the identity of the attorney's client
when it is apparent that the entity's interests are adverse to those of one or more
of its stakeholders and keeping paramount the best interest of the entity in each
and every facet of the representation. Each of the foregoing are examples of
sometimes overlooked standards of good corporate legal practice.
Finally, it seems almost too obvious and a little circular to suggest that an
attorney can better protect himself from liability associated with a Fassihi
Scenario by obeying the law. And yet it should be of some comfort for attorneys
to know that courts typically have only upheld the types of claims discussed
throughout this Article when the attorney has transgressed or assisted someone
to transgress a law either external or, more often, internal (i.e. constitutional law
of the entity).
Cacciola is a good example of this point. The attorney for the partnership
engineered a transaction that allowed one partner to acquire a deceased partner' s
interest. What made this otherwise innocuous action improper was that it was
carried out in violation of a partnership agreement granting the partnership the
first option to purchase the interest. Similarly, in Chern-Age, Glover's assisting
Dahl in selling the assets of the business might otherwise not have been
problematic. But the fact that Glover illegally notarized the signatures of
Pederson and Shepard on the corpo!"ation' s Articles of Incorporation and then
facilitated the sale of Chem-Age's assets without observing any corporate
formalities seemed to convince the court that the stakeholders might have a
viable claim against Glover.
On the other hand, the Richter court dismissed all of the claims brought
against Van Amberg even though the court believed that Richter had a colorable

169. For a'1 example of language to use in engagement letters in this context. see CHESTER
at app. 2B (6th ed.

ROHRUCH ET AL., ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES,

2001 ).

170. See, e.g., sources cited in supra note 156.
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claim against Gibbens for breach of fiduciary duty and Van Amberg assisted
Gibbens on several matters that Richter alleged to be wrongful. The court noted
that Van Amberg's behavior seemed consistent both with applicable ethical
standards and SFP's partnership agreement, which designated Gibbens as the
managing partner with decision-making authority on almost all partnership
matters.
Although the results in these cases are in part a reflection of the jurisdiction
in which they were brought, the matter is certainly not out of the attorney's
hands. Adherence to those provisions of the MRPC that apply to organizational
representation, corporate/entity formalities and applicable law will greatly reduce
an attorney's exposure to fiduciary liability with respect to individual
stakeholders of an entity client.

